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"Peoples Distinct from Others": The Making of Modern
Indian Law
Charles Wilkinson*
I. INTRODUCTION

The story of how tribes have taken back their reservations, and through
sovereign self-rule restored democracy and improved the lives of their people,
is surprising, both in the means and the magnitude, and it cuts against
preconceptions and stereotypes. Overwhelmingly, the central thrust has been
the work of Indian people. People in the agencies, courts, and Congress were
not sitting around wondering how they could benefit Indians. The tribes
themselves initiated litigation or invited it by assertions of tribal sovereignty
and jurisdiction and hunting, fishing, water, land and cultural rights. They
themselves brought forth the legislative proposals. They constructed the legal
framework in Indian country.
The institutions on the reservations are a critical part of Indian law. Indian
tribes now own and govern fifty-eight million acres of land in the contiguous
states,' "an area larger than all but ten states," 2 and tribal hunting, fishing,
water, and religious rights that reach beyond reservation boundaries. A million
people live on or adjacent to the reservations. Some federal and state laws
apply within the reservations (just as some federal and tribal laws apply within
the states), but the tribes are the primary governments in Indian country. Tribal
laws, including the actions of tribal administrative agencies, are important to
Indian people, but they matter to the nation as a whole because of the number
of people and the amount of land involved, and the significance of the issues.
Further, Indian law, and especially the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, has
been the foundation for the modern Indian movement as a whole. Tribes today
operate full-service governments that variously provide colleges, elementary
and secondary schools, and preschools; clinics, hospitals, and alcohol, drug,
and wellness programs; language restoration programs; museums and cultural
events; casinos and other forms of economic development; functions we more
specifically identify as "legal," including legislatures, courts, attorney generals
and tribal attorneys offices; police, probation, and counseling services; land,
*Distinguished University Professor and Moses Lasky Professor of Law, University of
Colorado. These thoughts were presented as the fortieth William H. Leary Lecture at the S.J.
Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, on November 3, 2005. This Article is drawn, in
part, from my book, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS (2005). My
thanks to my assistants, Josh Tenneson and Cynthia Carter, for their help on this piece. I
dedicate this Article to Lou Callister, long-time leader in the Utah bar.
'CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 207,

(2005).
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Id. at 207.
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water, timber, wildlife management, and pollution control agencies; and tax
and zoning boards.
Some of these functions could be done by Indian nongovernmental
organizations, although probably not as well, but most depend on the
governmental status of tribes. As Chief Justice John Marshall explained over a
century and a half ago, Indian tribes are nations, sovereigns, "a people distinct
from others," 3 one of the three sources of sovereignty under the Constitution.
Thus, they are entitled to govern their reservations under their own laws,
traditions, and priorities, and, as well, to be part of the intricate, sometimes
chaotic, but lastingly inventive webwork of democracy that characterizes the
United States of America.
My aim, then, is to present the outlines of how these dispossessed
peoples, small in population and wealth, undertook a daunting law reform
effort. Their journey has been marked by disappointments and setbacks, as
well as successes, but such is the stuff of ambitious movements. Tribal leaders
will sometimes pronounce, "We aren't going anywhere." That brief but
fiercely confident anthem sounds the rootedness, the determination, that fire
their law-driven revival. What Indian people have accomplished is nothing
short of stunning, testament not only to the efforts of the tribes but also to the
best ideals and structures of the larger nation.
I will go forth in this order: Rock Bottom, the low station of Indian law in
the 1950s; Origins, the initial gathering of Indian people to revive and improve
Indian law; An Indian Bar, access of tribes to lawyers starting in the late
1960s; Litigating, the giving and receiving of lawsuits; Statute Making, the
activity in Congress starting in the 1970s and, later, in the statehouses; and
Law on the Reservations,the making of tribal legal institutions.
II. ROCK BOTTOM
Indian law seemed to be on its last legs in the 1950s. It was a terrible time
out in Indian country: Native people were dispirited, enduring the worst health,
education, and economic conditions in the country and suffering a relentless
federal and church assimilation effort teaching them that being Indian was bad.
Tribes had no legal capacity. Virtually the only cases in the court system were
the tribal claims filed in the Indian Claims Commission under the 1946 Indian
Claims Commission Act.4 This statute-which allowed for the recovery of
money, but not land, for the taking of most of the country from the tribes 5 had tinges of beneficence, but was bred mainly of cynicism. The money
payments were minimal for most tribes and, once made, erased forever any
3

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
U.S.C. §§ 70-70v (1952) (omitted from current code since Commission terminated in
1978);5 see also id. (setting forth Indian Claims Commission and guidelines).
WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 223.
425
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claims for the land itself.6 Further, this making of amends, of supposedly
wiping the slate clean, would pave the way for the final termination of the
reservations and of Indian law itself.
In Congress, all the momentum was behind termination and rapid
assimilation. There was no program for improving reservation life. The tribes
still had not learned how to influence this powerful foreign government and
had no effective voices, even if anyone would have listened. The first wave of
termination bills hit the Menominee of Wisconsin, the Klamath of Oregon, and
the Mixed-Blood Utes and Southern Paiutes of Utah.7
The Interior Department was fully in line. The Bureau of Indian Affairs
("BIA") busily drew up lists of tribes eligible for termination and, except for
an occasional maverick BIA superintendent, enthusiastically justified
termination bills in Congress. Then there was the field of federal Indian law.
The great jurisprudential scholar, Felix Cohen, who left academia to serve in
the progressive Harold Ickes-John Collier administration, authored one of the
great treatises in American law, the 1942 Handbook of FederalIndian Law.8 In
1958 the Interior Department, fearing the force of Cohen's words, revised the
treatise and issued a bastardized version that scrubbed Cohen's-and John
Marshall's-powerful explanations of tribal sovereignty, the high federal duty
to tribes as trustee, and other inconvenient doctrines. 9
On the reservations, the idea that Indian tribes were sovereign
governments, that they could make and enforce laws, was of no moment at all.
The real government in Indian country was the BIA, pure and simple, and it
had been that way for generations. The agency ran the reservations by dint of
statutes, regulations, and manipulations of paper tribal councils through
withholding entitlements and handing out favors. To be sure, racism played a
role, but much more fundamentally, BIA officers were following orders from a
Congress that had no reason to pay much attention to Indian affairs and had not
countenanced an alternative to forced assimilation and termination.
III. ORIGINS
Somehow, Indians began to dare to take matters into their own hands. The
raw fear of termination had something to do with it. So as did the return of
veterans from World War II and the Korean War. They had gladly volunteered,
proven themselves brave and capable, and received, rather than discrimination,
6S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection ofIndigenous Peoples' Rights
over Lands and Natural Resources under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV.
HUM. 7RTS. J. 33, 68 (2001).

See 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (1958) (repealed 1973); 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-64w (Supp. 11 1955)
version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-64x (2000)); 25 U.S.C. §§ 677-77aa (2000); id. §§ 741-60.
(current
8
See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942).
9
See U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1958) [hereinafter FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW].
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praise and commendation. They didn't like what they saw at home. One of
them, Joe Garry of the Coeur d'Alene tribe, took over as the head of the nearmoribund National Congress of American Indians and, with help from Helen
Peterson, a Lakota Sioux, organized testimony of the termination bills. They
lost most of those fights, but had some successes, most notably the effort to
terminate and sell off the magnificent Flathead reservation in Montana.
Then, in the 1960s, came the flowering of the civil rights movement. One
of the legislative centerpieces was the War on Poverty, which would be carried
out by a proposed activist agency, the Office of Economic Opportunity
("OEO"). The drafters of the bill agreed that Indian people should be
beneficiaries, but there were problems. Indian country was beginning to stir,
and the talk was about sovereignty, about tribal governments. The drafters of
the OEO bill, however, never thinking of tribes as governments, considered
only three possible ways to deliver OEO services to Indians: through the BIA,
through the states, or through both the BIA and the states. In addition, no one
had consulted with tribal leaders.
Why shouldn't the grants go, not to the BIA or the state, but directly to
the tribes, who would best know how to serve Indian people? Why not take our
case to Congress?
Tribal leaders did exactly that. In May 1964 Garry, D'Arcy McNickle,
Vine Deloria, Jr., and others organized a gathering in Washington, D.C. that
they called the American Indian Capital Conference on Poverty.' 0 They
persuaded Vice President Hubert Humphrey, Secretary of the Interior Stewart
Udall, and influential members of Congress to attend. They made their case for
self-determination, for the right to run their own programs, for "the right," as
they called it, "to be right and the right to be wrong."
They achieved their goal by adding to the bill three words to the definition
of grantees of OEO funds. Those three words-"a tribal government"-were
the very first words in the entire history of the Republic that Indian people had
ever conceived of and lobbied into federal legislation."
IV. AN INDIAN BAR

Until the 1960s, lawyers had not much less influence on the reservations
than the BIA and the churches, and too often attorneys wrote dark chapters in
tribal histories. To some extent, it was not their doing. Penniless tribes had few
resources to retain attorneys. The law pushed attorneys toward just two feeproducing areas, mineral development and the money-damages claims cases
for lost land. Even honest, nonmanipulative lawyers-and not all were-had a
' 0 Alvin M. Josephy, Introduction to Melvin Thom, A Statement Made for the Young
People, in RED POWER: Ti-E AMERICAN INDIANS' FIGHT FOR FREEDOM 65-66 (Alvin M. Josephy

ed., 1971).
"See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2790(a), (f), repealed by Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 95 Stat. 357, 519 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9912 (2000)).
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powerful incentive in favor of that kind of representation rather than other
pressing matters that might have had a higher tribal priority.
The pattern of tribes being represented by lawyers from the cities, with no
real commitment to the full range of tribal needs, began to change with the
arrival of the legal services programs, part of the War on Poverty and still
mainstays in Indian country. The first was DNA, an abbreviation of a Navajo
phrase meaning "the organization that brings well-being to the people," which
set up shop in the mid-1960s, with the idealistic young attorneys themselves
constructing the modest office building in Window Rock.
The pent-up demand for lawyers at Navajo was unbelievable, especially
in the area of commercial transactions--debts, repossessions, and the like.
Navajo people also wanted to assert and protect tribal prerogatives such as
sovereignty and water rights. I'll always remember my first visit, in 1972, to
Window Rock and walking up to the DNA office and finding, even in the early
morning, the parking area filled with equal numbers of tethered horses and
well-used, dusty pick-ups. Inside, the waiting room and nearby offices were
abuzz with Navajo lawyers and paralegals doing interviews in Navajo and
interpreters passing on accounts from Navajo clients to white lawyers. A few
years later, I went up to the DNA office in Mexican Hat, which served the
Utah part of the reservation, and learned that their phone in that remote outpost
was on a twenty-one-party line. Not so great for confidential attorney-client
communications. Yet the new and vigorous representation of Navajo people
went on.
It is said that Native Americans are covered by more laws than anyone in
society save prisoners. By the late 1960s, Indian leaders made the goal of
creating Indian lawyers-there were only about a dozen at the time-a top
priority. The Pre-Law Summer Institute for American Indians opened in the
summer of 1968 at the University of New Mexico Law School.' 2 The idea was
to take thirty to forty potential law students and give them an intensive law
school curriculum for two months before entering law school. The idea was not
so much to teach them law as to introduce them to the rigorous, foreign, and
often sordid culture of legal education. If you're going to be abused by some
arrogant, Socratic cross-examiner, you might as well have some practice. The
idea took, and the Pre-Law Institute has been a main contributor to creating the
cadre of more than two thousand Native lawyers today.
The practice of Indian law changed in other fundamental ways. The
Native American Rights Fund and the Indian Law Resource Center took wing,
specializing in Indian law and representing tribes and individual Indians who

12See generally Heidi Estes & Robert Laurence, PreparingAmerican Indians for Law
School: The American Indian Law Center's Pre-Law Summer Institute, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV.

278, 278-86 (1992) (discussing structure of program created to increase number of American
Indians and Alaska Natives who graduate from law school).
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had no means to take on major litigation. 13 The legal services offices
developed big-case capabilities in addition to their casework. The private bar
steadily grew. Now dozens of smaller firms represent mostly tribal clients. The
large firms commonly have experts in Indian law, sometimes representing
tribal interests, sometimes their business partners or opponents in litigation.
The growing importance of the field is suggested by Indian law being a
mandatory bar exam course in New Mexico and Washington, with the bars of
California, Colorado, and Arizona now considering making that move.
In the late 1970s, the Navajos broke new ground by creating an attorney
general's office that today has more than twenty lawyers. Numerous other
tribes have established tribal on-reservation legal offices with several
attorneys. 14 Today most of the larger tribes-and a number of smaller ones as
well-organize their legal work much like a small state or large corporation in
that they have loyal, responsive, in-house attorney staffs and will call in
outside lawyers on specialized matters. In contrast to the situation two
generations ago, tribes have many more and far better attorneys and, as clients
should, exercise much more control over them.
The Supreme Court-properly, I think-often writes Indian law opinions
broadly in that they may apply to all or most tribes, not just the one at bar,
unless, of course, a tribe has a special treaty or statutory provision. There is
economy in this, for there are more than five hundred federally recognized
tribes; announcing general rules obviates the need for repetitive litigation.
Also, Congress has passed many statutes that apply to tribes generally. This
means that all tribes are likely to have an interest when just one tribe is
litigating questions of tribal sovereignty, the trust relationship, hunting, fishing,
and water rights, or tribal, federal, or state jurisdiction.
In the 1960s and 1970s, when the Indian bar was still small, there was a
good deal of coordination among tribal lawyers. In several instances, they
identified potential test cases with the best facts to be brought forth. This
strategic cooperation began to wane as the field expanded in every way. By the
1980s, Indian law was one of the most active areas on the Supreme Court's
docket-a pattern that still holds-with an average three or four opinions a
year, more than in fields such as international, environmental, and securities
law. Hundreds of others are pending in the lower courts.
Beginning in 2001 with the release of the opinions in Nevada v. Hicks 5
and Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley16 that limited tribal civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians, 17 the tribes came together in an attempt to achieve more
coordination over the sprawling field of Indian law litigation. The Tribal
3

See Ralph W. Johnson, Indian Tribes and the Legal System, 72 WASH L. REV. 1021,

1035-36 (1997).
14See id. at 1039.
15533 U.S. 353 (2001).
16532 U.S. 645 (2001).
17See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 367-69; Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 652-54.
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Supreme Court Project, sponsored by the largest intertribal organization, the
National Congress of American Indians, and administered by the Native
8
American Rights Fund, is modeled after an effort by the states.' In the early
1990s, state attorney generals on a national basis were frustrated by Supreme
Court opinions and decided to improve their quality of advocacy in front of the
Court.
Tribal attorneys now hold regular meetings and conference calls to
develop strategies for cases of general applicability. The first principle is that
every tribe has the right to make its own decisions and not be guided by the
Supreme Court Project. At the same time, the Project has been widely accepted
in Indian country and is regularly giving advice and support on such matters as
deciding which cases are favorable for certiorari, arguing for or against cert,
briefing and bringing in amici curiae on the merits, using experienced Supreme
Court advocates instead of trial attorneys for argument in front of the Court,
and mooting the case thoroughly before argument. The Supreme Court Project
is still young but it seems to be paying off, a necessary and significant
institution in firming up tribal representation in the making of Indian law.
V. LITIGATING
In the 1960s, Indian lawyers faced the monumental task of reviving a field
that time had seemingly passed by. John Marshall had done some of his best
and most courageous work in Indian law, acknowledging tribal sovereignty,
the trust relationship, tribal rights to land, and the general immunity of the
reservations from state jurisdiction. Felix Cohen had written his monumental
treatise true to Marshall's view in 1942. But with the steady decline of active
tribal governments, the embers of the Marshall-Cohen vision had grown cold.
The most influential case in the modem era, even with all of the activity
in the United States Supreme Court, came out of the United States District
9
Court for the Western District of Washington.' It is often referred to as the
Boldt Decision after its author, Judge George Hugo Boldt.
In the mid-1850s, tribes across the Pacific Northwest, from Puget Sound
2°
to western Montana, signed treaties with Isaac Stevens and Joel Palmer.
Stevens was the powerhouse of the two, smart, organized, and determined to
the depths of his being to eliminate as much Indian land ownership as possible
in order to open the Northwest to settlement by non-Indians. He bullied tribes,
drafted treaties in advance, consolidated tribes, selected chiefs, and forced
them to accept small reservations until wars of outrage in the Puget Sound area
forced him to accede to larger reservations.2'
' See Richard Guest, Native Am. Rights Fund, Tribal Supreme Court Project,
http://www.narf.org/cases/supctproj.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
19
384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
20See United States v. Washington,
See id. at 330-31.
2

1See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK'S LANDING 8-18 (2000).

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2006:379

With all his success-and there is no doubt that he achieved his main
objective of obtaining most of the Northwest for the United States-he could
not persuade the tribes to relinquish their right to fish for salmon on the
landscapes they ceded to the United States. Thus, on off-reservation land
occupied by tribes in aboriginal times-that is, on most of the Pacific
Northwest-tribes retained in the treaties "It]he right of taking fish, at all usual
22
and accustomed grounds.., in common with all citizens of the territory.,
The State of Washington paid little attention to these words that-without
the context of how tribes had built their societies on salmon and never would
have ceded their land without a guarantee of continued fishing-seemed so
vague and opaque. Beginning in the late 1800s, and accelerating dramatically
after World War II, state officers arrested Indian fishers for fishing without
state licenses and outside of state seasons. Tribal fishers, sick of serving jail
time and suffering confiscations of their catches, nets, and elaborately
constructed and carved cedar canoes, resisted. The "Fish Wars" became a
front-page issue in that state where the Pacific salmon is such an icon.23
In the late 1960s, idealistic, young Indian leaders-Janet McCloud, Hank
Adams, and others-succeeded in recruiting lawyers from the Native
American Rights Fund, Seattle Legal Services, and private practice. The
sprawling, complex litigation that resulted is notable for its high quality of
lawyering. Among many other things, the tribal attorneys worked tirelessly to
persuade Interior Department lawyers, the U.S. Attorney in Seattle, and finally
the Justice Department in Washington and the Nixon White House to
acknowledge the federal government's obligation as trustee to file on behalf of
the tribes and their treaty rights. Indeed, in 1970 the Justice Departmentrather than the tribes-launched United States v. Washington24 in federal court
(although the tribes would soon intervene).25 Does it not add quite a lot of
credibility to have the United States of America weigh in on a very big
controversy over a very few old words?
After lengthy discovery and trial, Judge Boldt handed down his decision
on February 12, 1974.26 Initially, the tribal lawyers held serious misgivings
about Boldt, a tough, law-and-order Eisenhower appointee, but as they
watched the proper, diminutive, bow-tied judge during the long lead-up to trial,
they began to think they saw a classic jurist who could rule on the law and the
facts and who did not lack courage. His opinion, intentionally released on
Lincoln's birthday, reflected his reading, listening, and appreciation of the
distinctive characteristics of Indian law. He understood the treaty
negotiations-that under American law the tribes came to the negotiations as
22

See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 331.
See generally WILKINSON, supra note 21, at 29-47 (discussing history of Nisqually river
before late 1960s).
24384 F. Supp. 312.
25
See WILKINSON, supra note 21, at 44-55.
26
See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 312.
23
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sovereigns and landowners, that the tribal representatives knew they had to
relinquish much of their land, and that the tribes had made the calculation that
they had a chance to preserve their societies if they could preserve their ability
to take the salmon. Judge Boldt also knew the legally obvious, though it was
not evident to state officials and the commercial and sports fishermen, that
these treaties were major events in American history and that their words
remained in place as the supreme law of the land unless Congress chose to
change them, which it never had.27
28
Judge Boldt ruled that the treaties remained in force. As Supreme Court
29 he construed the treaty language that tribes had the right to
cases required,
fish "in common with" non-Indians at all off-reservation fishing sites in favor
of the tribes because the treaties had been negotiated in the spare, fivehundred-word Chinook jargon and then written down in English, a foreign
language to the tribes; because the United States was the more powerful party;
3°
and because the United States is trustee to the tribes. Using that rule of
interpretation and knowing from extensive trial testimony from academic
experts and tribal elders how insistent the tribes were in holding onto their
fishing rights, he found that "in common with" meant that tribes had the right
to take fifty percent of the runs. 3 1 He also found that tribes were, and always
had been, governments, and that they, not the state, had the sovereign authority
to regulate Indian fishing.32
American law has no prouder moment. The Supreme Court affirmed the
Boldt decision in 1979, 33 but Judge Boldt's much-watched ruling, so full, so
rife with integrity, was the signal event announcing that Indian law was no
dead letter and that Indian people were breathing life back into it.
The Boldt decision looked in part to Supreme Court decisions beginning
34
in 1959 that involved much less momentous issues but that favored the tribes.
For some thirty years, through the late 1980s, the Court mostly ruled in favor
of tribal assertions of rights to sovereignty, land, court jurisdiction, regulatory
jurisdiction including taxation and gaming, and resource rights. Several
27

See WILKINSON, supra note 21, at 60-62.
28Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 340.
29

E.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 518-19 (1832); see also United States
v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905) (requiring treaty interpretation .as original parties
it).
understood
30
See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 330-39.
31
1d. at 343-44.
32
1d. at 400-01.
33

See Washington v. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 669-74,
696 (1979).
34
In 1959 the United States Supreme Court decided Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959),
which signaled the beginning of the modem era of federal Indian law. CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 1 (1987).
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opinions addressed a main conceptual issue, whether Indian rights are "racebased," by consistently holding that the field of Indian law is based largely on
a government-to-government relationship between tribes and the United States;
thus an individual Indian may exercise, say, a fishing right or benefit from a
federal hiring preference, but is doing so-not as a member of a race-but as a
citizen of a tribal government.35 Another leading opinion came out of
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians36 in 1987, where the Court
ruled that California could not regulate tribal gaming because of the limited
reach of state law into Indian country.3 7
John Marshall laid the foundation for many of the modem cases in three
comprehensive opinions, most notably Worcester v. Georgia" in 1832. 39 In
that case, the Court addressed a series of Georgia laws that, if valid,
eviscerated the large and powerful Cherokee Nation-its legislature, courts,
and land.4 ° Writing for the Court, Marshall struck the state laws down, drawing
the full ferocity of President Andrew Jackson, who rumbled that "John
41
Marshall has made his decision: now let him enforce it!",

Marshall's opinion in Worcester explained what political scientists,
anthropologists, and jursisprudential scholars have always known, that before
contact with whites, Indian tribes were sovereign governments: they made laws
and enforced them. Though recognizing the superior power of the United
States in the treaties, they never relinquished that independent sovereignty.
They remained, as Marshall put it, "a people distinct from others. 42 It is that
sovereignty, the status of tribes as one of the three sources of sovereignty in
our constitutional system of governance, that is to Indian people the most basic
of all civil rights. It is what Cherokee chiefs fought so hard for in their day, and
what modem tribal leaders fight for in theirs.
The Court changed directions in the late 1980s and the tribes found
themselves losing most of their cases, especially in the realm of tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.43 Several factors were at work. With many
foundational aspects of Indian law settled, the tribes had been pushing for
extensions of the law. Perhaps, as discussed, litigation strategy, especially
Supreme Court advocacy, sometimes came up short. Justice Thurgood
Marshall, a hero to Indian people who took a special interest in Indian law and
35

See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) ("[P]reference is political

rather than racial in nature.").
36480 U.S. 202 (1987).
37

See id. at 221-22.
3831 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
39
See id.; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh,
21 U.S.
4 0 (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 542.
41 1 HORACE GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT 106
(1864).
42

Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364-69 (2000). See generally Strate v.
A-I
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (holding that tribal authority over nontribal members is
limited to legislative jurisdiction).
43
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wrote many of the major opinions and kept a vigilant eye on the others, retired
in 1991.
The most frustrating reason has been the intransigence of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, recently deceased, and Justices Scalia and Thomas. They've had no
patience with the complex, counterintuitive field of Indian law, have been
regular "no" votes, and sometimes have pulled in other justices. For nearly a
generation the tribes, confronted with three hostile justices, often have been
placed in the demanding position of persuading five of six justices.
an
There has been nothing conservative about this. The three justices,
avowedly concerned with the original intent of the Founders, have never given
serious analysis to how robust tribal sovereignty was in the 1780s and to how
critical it was for the young nation to make treaties and otherwise forge
alliances with the tribes; very plausibly, then, the original intent of the
Constitution's reference to Indian tribes was to recognize them as strong,
substantial governments. The three justices have refused to examine seriously
the text, minutes, or context of treaties that carried out one of the principal
policies of the nation's first century of existence. They have paid little heed to
stare decisis, refusing to follow precedent generally, even carefully thought-out
45
opinions handed down as recently as the 1980s. Their opinions fail to defer to
the consistent self-determination policy of Congress, which has principal
authority over Indian affairs under Article I of the Constitution. Although
normally suspicious of federal power and deferential to local authority, they
have ignored the fact that, in Indian country, the tribes, far more than the
states, are the governments in our federal system closest to the ground, most
able to serve those citizenries.
Perhaps the most notable instance is Justice Scalia's 2001 opinion in
Nevada v. Hicks.46 It was a close and difficult case and I have no quarrel with
the holding against the tribe. But Scalia roamed far beyond the facts to offer all
47
manner of unnecessary asides on Indian law. For example, he exactly
reversed a century and a half of jurisprudence ever since Worcester v.
Georgia4 8 -that state law normally does not apply on the reservations-by
writing the opposite, that "'[o]rdinarily,' it is now clear, 'an Indian reservation
' 4
is considered part of the territory of the State. 9 As support for this radical
50
proposition he offered only two sources, both discredited: a 1962 opinion that
44See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119
HARV.

L. REV. 431, 459-60 (2005).

45See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States'

Rights, Color-BlindJustice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 267-68 (2001).
46533 U.S. 353 (2000).
47See Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and
Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1236 (2001).
4831 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
533 U.S. at 361-62 (quoting FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9,at 510 n.1).
"Hicks,
50
See Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962).
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the Court later renounced 5' and the revisionist version of the Felix Cohen
treatise that the termination-minded Interior Department issued in 1958.52
Justice O'Connor, in an atypically scathing concurring opinion, found Scalia's
opinion "unmoored from our precedents," and that it, "without cause,
undermines the authority of tribes to 'make their own laws and be ruled by
them.' 53 The majority opinion by Scalia in Hicks may well become one of
those that future Justices will just politely ignore, but it remains on the books
as an example of the extremist judicial agenda that now haunts Indian law.
Of course, just as tribes did not prevail in every case from the 1950s
through the 1980s, neither have they always come up short during this recent
stretch. They achieved important victories on hunting and fishing rights54 and

on Congress's authority to override a Supreme Court opinion that limited tribal
jurisdiction.55 In a larger sense, the sovereignty now recognized by the courts
remains substantial and the tribes have worked hard in the legislatures and on
the reservations to fortify their rights. In all-and this is a point I'll elaborate
on-the persistence of tribes has led to a surprising dynamic, especially given
the primacy that Indian leaders have placed on litigation in the modem era:
over the past fifteen or so years, when the Court has been generally crabbed in
ruling on tribal assertions of sovereignty, during that same period the actual
authority of tribes-their real-world quantum of legal, political, and economic
power-has gone steadily up.
VI. STATUTE MAKING

There is a sense that Congress does not so much pass laws as it receives
proposals from interest groups (who often draft their proposed legislation) and
then the national legislature accepts some of those proposals and rejects others.
The tribes did that for the first time in 1964 when they added their three words
to the OEO legislation. In time they became full participants in the making of
statutory Indian law.
Forrest Gerard, a Blackfeet tribal member who, in 1971, became the
second American Indian congressional staffer and was responsible for Indian
affairs on the Senate Interior Committee, has seen the whole progression.
"When I first sat in the committee room during hearings," Gerard told me,
"here's what I saw. I saw polished lobbyists for industry, energy, the
environment, wildlife, parks. Indian representation was not that developed. But
over my several years on the committee, I could see an emerging
5

'See McClanahan v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.8, 176 n.15,
180 n.20

(1973).52

See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9, at 510 & n. 1.
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 387 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Strate v. A-I Contractors,
520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997)).
54See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172, 204-05 (1999).
55
See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
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on the Menominee Restoration Act,
sophistication. Ada Deer, for example,
56
charismatic.,
so
was so impressive,
"By, say, 1990," he continued,
tribes had a much better understanding of the legislative process. By
then the system had produced more Indian lawyers and tribes had
more Indian representation. Tribal leaders were much more
knowledgeable. Most citizens don't know that the agencies can't57 sue,
know that.
only the Department of Justice can, but tribal leaders
Then, Gerard, who chooses his words carefully, said this: "Today, the quality
58
of tribal representation in Congress is on a par with Microsoft and US Steel.
For the past thirty-five years, despite the relatively small population of
Indians, tribes have put through literally hundreds of laws. Some have been
overarching laws, applying to all tribes, on self-determination, health, housing,
education (including tribal colleges), tribal courts, natural resources
management and research, and other subjects. Many laws, including most of
the environmental statutes, treat tribes as states so that, for example, some
tribal governments administer the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act on the
reservations. Other statutes have been put forth by individual tribes and have
dealt with such matters as land acquisition, jurisdiction, and funding proposals.
The self-determination legislation, initiated in 1975 and broadened and
strengthened several times since at the behest of tribal leaders, deserves special
mention. The BIA had for so long been such an affront to tribalism, to personal
dignity. The self-determination statutes allowed the tribes to take over BIA
programs and directed the agency to step back. It took time for the tribes to
achieve self-rule, but the tribal leaders refused to take no for an answer, and
congressional will held firm.
In addition to identifying priorities and lobbying for them, tribes have
been able to fend off almost all of the attempts to limit tribal rights
legislatively. "Indian rights" may seem benign but tribal actions have
threatened non-Indian rights holders, including landowners. The Boldt decision
on fishing rights forced many salmon non-Indian boats off the waters; state and
federal buy-out programs helped financially, but not emotionally, for those
non-Indian fishers who loved to work on the open ocean. "Jurisdiction" may
seem like a grey term, but not to a non-Indian reservation resident who is
taxed, zoned, or brought into tribal court. Tribal gaming, however much the
proceeds may benefit low-income Indian people and charities in nearby
56

Interview with Forrest Gerard, former congressional staffer, in Albuquerque, N.M. (Oct.

17, 2002).
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communities, may be opposed by people who simply don't approve of gaming,
Indian or otherwise.
Ever since the 1970s, tribes faced serious efforts to eliminate or reduce
tribal prerogatives in all of these areas and more, but in nearly every case tribal
leaders defeated the measures. Indians suffered some significant federal budget
cuts and, recently, appropriations riders that they opposed. They will face still
more cuts. Now Senator John McCain, a supporter of the tribes on most issues,
is proposing a measure that would prohibit off-reservation tribal gaming
(Indian gaming is already prohibited throughout the borders of the two states,
Utah and Hawaii, that outlaw all forms of gaming). Mostly, however, Congress
has remained faithful to self-determination.
The heart of the matter is participation. As early as the 1700s, tribes sent
delegations to Washington but they were never involved in the mechanics of
legislation. Now tribes are involved at every stage of all legislation affecting
Indians. Bills and hearing records are flyspecked by many protribal lobbyistssome with nonprofits, others in Washington offices that some tribes have
established, still others with many professional lobbying firms that do some
Indian business. Tribes have access. Tribal leaders are politicians and, like
state and local officials, work with senators and members of congress from
both parties. Most tribes have good, ongoing relations with their congressional
delegations. Now, many states have formalized government-to-government
relationships with tribes and some state legislatures have enacted laws
proposed by tribes.
For better or worse, the nature of democracy in modern America requires
that any group affected by federal or state legislation must participate in
politics, in lobbying, to protect or improve its situation. Tribes do not somehow
control Congress, but they do operate on a surprisingly level playing field, and
this has fundamentally changed the making of Indian laws.
VII. LAW ON THE RESERVATIONS

No longer does the BIA govern Indian country. Tribal governments, with
a handful of employees at most in the 1960s, have dramatically expanded and
diversified. At least seventy tribes, with more than 90 percent of the Indian
populations, have three hundred or more governmental employees, excluding
gaming operations. 59 Typically they are as large or larger than nearby county
governments. The tribal councils, which are legislatures, make the positive
law. Many of their administrative agencies-for example, the police, taxation
and land use boards, and natural resource offices with jurisdiction over
grazing, timber, water, recreation, and wildlife-make regulations and enforce
them. All of these laws and others can and do end up in tribal court. Because of
their importance to the reservations, I will focus my remarks on the courts.
59

See WILKINSON, supra note

1, at 294-95.
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Federal statutes and Supreme Court decisions have charted out the
jurisdiction of tribal courts. In the 1978 case of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe,60 the Court ruled that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians. 6' The tribes had put forth a compelling fact situation-the defendants
had engaged in disorderly conduct at the annual Suquamish celebration, Chief
Seattle Days, and eventually rammed their pickup truck into a tribal police
car-but to no avail as the Court, by Justice Rehnquist, ruled that the United
States did not intend in the treaties to submit its citizens to tribal criminal
prosecutions. 62
While tribes possess broad criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and
no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, there is a third categorynonmember Indians, such as when the Ute Tribe might assert criminal
jurisdiction over a Sioux. In the 1989 case of Duro v. Reina,63 the Court held
that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. 64 Then
Congress, responding to entreaties from Indian leaders, legislatively overruled66
Lara
Duro in 1990.65 In 2004 the Supreme Court in United States v.
recognized the primacy of Congress in Indian law and upheld the legislative
override of Duro so that tribes may assert criminal jurisdiction over members
of other tribes as well as their own members.6 7
Tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers in civil matters has proceeded
differently, basically because imprisonment is not an issue. From 1959 through
the 1980s, the Court recognized quite broad civil court and regulatory
jurisdiction over non-Indians. The so-called "tribal interest" test, developed in
several decisions in the 1980s, honored tribal jurisdiction if some important
tribal interest was involved.68 Then, in the 2001 case of Atkinson Trading Co.
v. Shirley,69 another Rehnquist opinion, the court struck down a Navajo hotel
occupancy tax on an establishment run by a non-Indian on non-Indian land
within the reservation. 70 As with Oliphant, tribal attorneys thought that the
case presented favorable facts-people came to the hotel mainly because of

U.S. 191 (1978).
id. at 195.
See id. at 199.
63495 U.S. 676 (1990).
64See
id. at 688.
65
See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b), 104
Stat. 1856, 1892 (1991) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000)).
60435
61
See
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66541 U.S. 193 (2004).
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See id. at 200.
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sovereignty).
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Navajo culture and the tribe provided police, fire, and other services-but,
nevertheless, the Court denied the tribal assertion of tax jurisdiction.7 1
These and the other recent decisions are well known in the tribal council
chambers and, as with their successful congressional campaign on jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians, tribal leaders have fought back. For example, the
Court has been especially reluctant to uphold tribal civil jurisdiction over nonIndians when the cases arise on non-Indian land or state highway easements
across Indian land.72 In response, tribes have accelerated their already
aggressive land acquisition programs and have refused to consent to new state
highway easements unless the states agree to tribal jurisdiction on those roads.
In any event, even with the limited jurisdiction over non-Indians, tribal courts
are busy, critical institutions in Indian country with court dockets for the larger
tribes holding thousands, or tens of thousands, of cases.73
Tribal justice systems reach back into the millennia, but the courts in their
current incarnations are young, many of them being formed, or revived, since
the 1970s.74 They are underfunded but have a dedicated corps of tribal judges.
The steady movement has been toward lawyer judges and Indian judges, and
both are now in the majority. The most troubling criticism has been that tribal
council members have sometimes put pressure on judges when family
members or pet issues come to court. Such interferences seem never to have
been common and are declining, with increased sophistication and
professionalism in both the councils and the tribal judiciary on the rise. Also,
many tribal constitutions were adopted decades ago and those BIA-drafted
constitutions gave the councils line authority over all tribal functions, including
the courts. Tribes are gradually amending constitutions or adopting codes to
provide for judicial independence.
Tribal justice systems are maturing and the ultimate objective is now
clear: as with most endeavors in Indian country today, the tribes want to enrich
tribal life by using both the worthwhile ideas and benefits from the larger
society and the traditions of the tribe. Court proceedings are rife with Miranda
warnings, formal rules of procedure and evidence, and access to tribal
appellate courts. Having gone to great length to incorporate Anglo procedures,
tribes are now deep into the exciting enterprise of integrating tribal traditions
into the tribal justice systems.75
71

See id. at 654-55.
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Some tribes have code provisions that require the courts to look to
traditions, and many tribal courts have written opinions exhibiting aspects of
the common law of their own reservations. 76 Individual judges also find it
appropriate to bring customs into their judging. Chief Justice Malcolm
Escalante of the Tohono O'odham Nation of Arizona gives juveniles access to
medicine men, or Maka'i, for counseling. Once I visited the tribal court at the
Warm Springs reservation in Oregon. One of the cases was a probate
proceeding and a daughter put in a claim for compensation for the time she
spent caring for her mother during her final days. The daughter's attorney
argued that that Oregon law supported such a claim and Chief Judge Irene
Wells asked him to submit a brief on the issue. Afterward, I met with Judge
Wells in her chambers and asked her how she planned to rule on the question.
She replied, "Well, I'll read the brief but this is a matter of Warm Springs, not
Oregon, law and I'm pretty well satisfied that at Warm Springs people are
expected to care for their parents, and that doesn't include compensation. 7 7
Just as tribes are looking to their traditions for substantive law, so too are
they rediscovering traditional approaches toward resolving disputes and
punishment. 78 In aboriginal times, the overriding concern in most tribal justice
systems was making the victim and injured family whole and maintaining
village stability and harmony. Sanctions such as imprisonment and capital
punishment did not address the needs of the wronged family. Fair payment to
the family, often determined in discussions between the families mediated by
an elder, created less resentment among the guilty party's family and allowed
him to be a productive member of the community. In some tribes, such as
those in western Oregon, the overall goal of restoring order and promoting
peace and harmony in the village were also furthered by the rule that, once
compensation was decided on and paid, it was final-even bringing it up later
was an offense that would itself require compensation. We call this restorative
justice, and while the federal and state systems have traditionally been
premised on retributive justice, restorative justice is in the ascendancy in this
country and other nations.79
The Navajo Nation has adopted an elaborate and much-praised
Peacemaker system, in which tribal elders meet with the parties, and often their
parents and other family members, to talk through the conflict in the context of
12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 191, 192-96 (2001); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom
Law, 24 N.M. L. REv. 225, 232-56 (1994).
and Innovative
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Reservation,
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the Navajo way. 80 Navajo Nation Chief Justice Robert Yazzie has explained
that the Anglo system is "vertical," with the judge at the top, while
peacemaking is "horizontal," with the peacemaker, the parties, and the families
all treated as equals. 81 The goal is to achieve true justice among the individuals
and the larger community. When agreements are reached, the result is usually
sealed by a Navajo ceremony. Many other tribes have adopted peacemaking
processes and other aspects of restorative justice because the approach
represents their traditional way of conflict resolution as well.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I'll finish off by saying this: I've emphasized the extraordinary
accomplishments of Indian people, but I'd like to return to my earlier reference
to the ideals and the constitutional and legal system of the United States of
America.
Idealism in the making of public law and policy so often seems in such
short supply, and one can point to numerous instances in which tribal rights
have been denied, often peremptorily, without fair or deep consideration. Yet,
despite the blemishes, the full tableau is brightly drawn with bold strokes of
minority rights, historical redemption, and morality. The nation's legal system
has accepted this despite the disruption, strangeness, and inconvenience that
action in the name of minority rights, historical redemption, and morality
always entails.
Indian tribes have now become active members of our nation's
community of government. That is a great and historic accomplishment for the
tribes and the country, but it comes with the rasping and colliding with other
governments that is, and always will be, the bane and brilliance of our federal
system. What of the future? Two things are sure. The rasping and colliding will
continue. And so will the determination of Indian tribal leaders. "We aren't
going anywhere."
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